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INTRODUCTION 
On April 23, 2004, the Salt Lake City Police Department terminated Officer David 
P. Greer's 24-year career as a police officer, 12 of which were spent as president of the 
police union. On April 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission upheld his termination 
based upon three separate incidents detailed in the opening brief, the Dispatch Incident, 
the Emery Incident, and the Mikanovic Incident. (Opening Br. at 6-15.) 
In the opening brief, Officer Greer demonstrated that the Commission 
(i) misinterpreted and misapplied several Department rules, (ii) accepted facts urged by 
the Department that directly contradicted the Department's own formal findings, and 
(iii) when determining whether termination was an appropriate sanction, considered 
legally irrelevant information. In all, Officer Greer advanced five grounds for reversal. 
The Department's brief in response does not even attempt to address four of the grounds 
and addresses the fifth ground in a single paragraph. The five grounds for reversal are as 
follows. 
First, the Commission ruled that Officer Greer violated D20-05-00.001 by failing 
"to support coworkers," even though the Commission could find only that a dispatcher 
believed Officer Greer was failing to respond to an assigned call. (R. 298.) This limited 
finding was not an oversight, as Officer Greer, in fact, did respond to the call and 
therefore, in fact, did support his coworker. (Opening Br. at 32-34.) The Commission 
erred by interpreting D20-05-00.00 to encompass its factual findings. 
1
 "Employees shall perform their duties in a cooperative and supportive manner, one with 
another." SLCPD Policy D20-05-00.00 (Opening Brief at Addendum A). 
Second, the Commission ruled that Officer Greer violated D20-05-01.002 in 
failing to display courtesy to "personnel holding higher levels of authority" by making 
"vulgar and angry references [about a] dispatcher" to Lieutenant Orgill. (R. 298.) The 
problem with the Commission's factual finding—that Officer Greer made the vulgar 
references—is that the Department had already fully investigated this allegation in a case 
involving Officer Greer and another officer3 and formally found that there was 
insufficient evidence that Officer Greer made the vulgar references. (Opening Br. at 34-
36.) The Department cannot take a position contrary to its own formal factual findings. 
Third, the Commission ruled that Officer Greer was insubordinate in violation of 
D20-03-00.004 when Lieutenant Orgill had to ask Officer Greer to leave a residence 
"three or four times, with the last time in a stern and commanding voice." (R. 303.) 
Officer Greer argued that he had a legitimate reason for delaying his departure, as he had 
not completed his duties as the responding officer. (Opening Br. at 36-37.) The 
Commission did not find otherwise, but instead found that Officer Greer "did not 
adequately convey those concerns to Lieutenant Orgill." (R. 300.) Failing to convey 
those concerns does not constitute insubordination. 
2
 "Employees shall display courtesy and respect in words, deeds, gestures, and actions 
towards personnel holding higher levels of authority." SLCPD Policy D20-05-01.00 
(Opening Brief at Addendum A). 
3
 The case involved a charge that Officer Greer and his partner—Officer Stuck—had been 
untruthful by denying Officer Greer had uttered the vulgarities. The Department 
formally concluded there was insufficient evidence either officer had been untruthful, 
meaning there was insufficient evidence Officer Greer uttered the vulgarities. (R. 298.) 
4
 "Insubordination occurs when an employee is capable of performing but refuses to do a 
job or comply with a lawful verbal or written directive." SLCPD Policy D20-03-00.00 
(Opening Brief at Addendum A). 
Fourth, the Commission ruled that termination was a proportionate sanction in 
light of three previous "disciplinary actions" between 1998 and 2002, which followed a 
nine-year gap with no disciplinary action of any kind. (R. 306.) The Commission then 
found that "[wjere it not for the incidents from 1998 to 2002, this gap would have shown 
the effectiveness of progressive discipline and . . . [i]f Officer Greer had maintained this 
period of good behavior through to the present, this matter would not have come before 
the Commission." (R. 306.) The problem with the Commission's ruling is that there 
simply were not three "disciplinary actions'" between 1998 and 2002, as two were 
"instructional interviews," which are purposefully not discipline under Department 
policy. Instead, instructional interviews are just what the Department conceded they 
were at the hearing, "a training," which is reflected by the fact that "discipline" and 
"instruction" are located in entirely different sections of the policy manual.5 (R. 235:12.) 
Instructional interviews, by design, do not find policy violations and do not result in any 
sanction, and therefore, the Commission erred by treating instructional interviews as prior 
discipline. By the Commission's own standard, with these two instructional interviews 
properly characterized, termination is inappropriate. 
Finally, the Commission ruled that termination was consistent with prior sanctions 
imposed by the Department by comparing this case to "fourteen circumstances in which a 
police officer chose to resign prior to or in lieu of disciplinary action." (R. 307-08.) The 
Commission erred in treating the resignation cases as termination cases, especially since 
the Department had not even determined whether it would seek termination in these cases 
5
 Discipline is outlined in SLCPD Policy D38-03-00.00, whereas instructional interviews 
are outlined in SLCPD Policy C09-04-02.00(7), which describes them as a "one-on-one 
training." (Opening Br. at Addendum A.) 
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before the officers resigned and, more important, the officers themselves had not been 
informed of any decision by the department concerning discipline before they resigned. 
(R. 229:243-307.) The resignation cases are irrelevant, as officers resign for a number of 
reasons, not only because they inevitably would lose in challenging an unspecified 
sanction. As Officer Greer demonstrated in the opening brief, the Commission had to 
consider the resignation cases as termination cases to conclude termination here was 
consistent with prior sanctions (Opening Br. at 45-50), and the Department does not 
suggest otherwise in its response brief. 
In responding to these five grounds for reversal, the Department does not dispute 
that the Commission misapplied Department rules, that the Department advanced a 
factual position directly contradicted by its own formal findings, or that instructional 
interviews are not discipline. Instead, the Department re-characterizes Officer Greer's 
arguments as challenges to factual findings and then argues that Officer Greer has failed 
to marshal evidence. (Resp. Br. at 1, 33-42.) Officer Greer does not challenge factual 
findings, but instead relies upon the Commission's factual findings to demonstrate the 
Commission misapplied Department rules and the standards set forth by the Court. 
Ironically, it is the Department that challenges the Commission's findings by 
assuming the Commission made factual findings twice urged by the Department and 
twice rejected by the Commission. For instance, the Department asserts that the 
Commission found Officer Greer (i) made physical contact with a citizen, Vanja 
Mikanovic; (ii) refused to take calls from the dispatcher; and (iii) had no legitimate 
reason for delaying his compliance with Lieutenant Orgill's order to leave the residence. 
(Resp. Br. at 7-8, 34, 40.) The Commission found none of these facts, despite the 
Department's repeated urging. 
By focusing its entire argument on the marshaling requirement, the Department 
does not even address Officer Greer's first four arguments. The only argument the 
Department does address is that the Commission erred by relying upon the resignation 
cases. The Department responds in one paragraph, asserting that ignoring the resignation 
cases "would lead to an absurd result" because if two officers violate the same rule and 
one resigns, the second officer would be "immunized" from being terminated for the 
same rule violation. (Resp. Br. at 47.) It is difficult to understand how this absurd result 
follows, as the Commission could compare the Department's decision to terminate with 
prior sanctions, just as it could when only one officer violates a rule. Officer Greer has 
never argued the resignation cases immunize him, but instead argues they are irrelevant, 
and therefore should not have been considered because the officers were not aware of any 
possible sanction when they resigned. In the end, the Department has not addressed the 
fifth ground for reversal either. 
The Department does not oppose Officer Greer's arguments because it cannot. 
Any one of the grounds articulated in Officer Greer's opening brief warrants reversal. 
The Court should vacate the Commission's order and reinstate Officer Greer to his 
ft 7 
position as a police officer, a position he served with distinction for more than 24 years. 
6
 During Officer Greer's 24-year career, he was twice awarded the Police Star for heroism 
and bravery, had only one disciplinary action against him during a 13-year span between 
1989 and 2002, and was elected president of the police union for 12 consecutive years by 
his fellow officers. (R. 1-3; 236:235, 396.) 
7
 Apparently, while Officer Greer served as police union president he must have upset 
those in management, as within months of stepping down as union president, the 
ARGUMENT 
The Department's primary argument in its response brief is that Officer Greer 
failed to marshal evidence, and therefore, the Court should affirm on that basis alone. 
The Department misunderstands Officer Greer's arguments, which accept (and even 
employ) the Commission's factual findings and do not challenge them. Officer Greer 
does not argue the evidence is insufficient to support the factual findings—although it 
is—but instead argues that the Commission's factual findings do not support the 
Commission's legal conclusions. As a result, Officer Greer had no duty to marshal 
evidence, and the bulk of the Department's brief is beside the point. 
The only argument the Department addresses is that the Commission erred by 
relying upon resignation cases in determining whether termination in this case is 
consistent with prior discipline imposed by the Department. The Department argues that 
failing to consider resignation cases leads to the absurd result of future officers being 
immunized when they violate similar rules. The Department again misunderstands 
Department had stacked together the charges at issue here and terminated Officer Greer's 
career. (R. 1-3; 236:396.) The Department's investigation in this case was anything but 
typical: (i) Chief Dinse had no explanation for why the Department violated its own 
policy by waiting more than three months to inform Officer Greer of any problem 
stemming from the Dispatch Incident (Opening Br. at 18 n.12); (ii) the Department 
withheld relevant information about witnesses (id. at 14 n.8); (iii) the Department 
terminated interviews with citizens when they began providing answers consistent with 
Officer Greer's version of events (id. at 10 n.6); and (iv) the Department permitted a 
captain to sustain his own complaint, a violation of Department policy (id. at 9 n.5). 
The proceedings before the Commission reveal similar irregularities. Officer Greer 
again urges the Court to listen to the tape of the dispatch incident (Supplement B) where 
a "tirade" supposedly took place (Opening Br. at 15), and compare the difference 
between the Commission's questioning of witnesses favorable to the Department and 
those favorable to Officer Greer. (Opening Br. at 14 n.9.) While these irregularities, by 
themselves, may not provide a basis for reversal, they do provide a more accurate picture 
of what occurred both during the investigation and before the Commission. 
4418?f> 
Officer Greer's position. As demonstrated below, Officer Greer contends that resignation 
cases are irrelevant and neither an officer nor the Department can use them before the 
Commission. For all of the reasons outlined in Officer Greer's opening brief—which are 
not addressed, let alone refuted, by the Department—the Court should reverse. 
I. The Marshaling Requirement Is Inapplicable Because Officer Greer Relies 
Upon, and Does Not Challenge, the Commission's Factual Findings 
Officer Greer's arguments rely upon, and do not challenge, the Commission's 
factual findings. Thus, the marshaling requirement does not apply. The marshaling 
requirement mandates that one challenging a court's factual findings "must first marshal 
all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the 
court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177. "This duty requires an 
appellant to marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and 
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted). The penalty for failing to marshal when required is that the Court 
"assume[s] the record supports the Commission's findings." Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 
973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The marshaling requirement can have no effect on this appeal, as Officer Greer 
already accepts the Commission's carefully worded findings of fact, which do not 
support the violations urged by the Department or justify the sanction imposed by the 
Department. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) 
(quotations and citation omitted) (the legal effect of specific facts "is the province of the 
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appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such 
questions of law"). In the opening brief, Officer Greer repeatedly makes clear that he is 
not challenging the findings of fact. For example, the opening brief states that 
(i) To sustain the Department's moving target, the 
Commission had to word its factual findings carefully, but in 
doing so its factual findings do not support the violations 
alleged by the Department; 
(ii) Given its own factual findings—which Officer Greer 
vigorously disputes outside the context of this appeal—the 
Commission abused its discretion in concluding Officer Greer 
violated these policies; 
(iii) Whatever the Commission's reasoning, it did not find 
that Officer Greer refused to take either call, and therefore, 
the Department's charge that Officer Greer refused to support 
coworkers for the Dispatch Incident has no reasonable basis. 
(Opening Br. at 31, 32, 34.) At times, the Department even acknowledges that Officer 
Greer is not challenging the Commission's factual findings: "Officer Greer has cited to 
the [Commission's] opinion when stating these facts." (Resp. Br. at 6 n.4.) The 
marshaling requirement does not apply, but even if it did, the result would be that the 
Court accept the very factual findings Officer Greer relies upon. 
II. Ironically, It Is the Department, Not Officer Greer, That Does Not Accept the 
Commission's Findings of Fact 
From the outset of this case, the Department has known that additional facts were 
required to support termination. Just after Chief Dinse issued his termination letter and 
the Department's counsel became involved, the Department realized that its grounds for 
termination were inadequate. In an attempt to remedy the deficiency, the Department 
attached a 40-page memorandum drafted by the Department's counsel to supplement the 
termination letter after the fact. (R. 4-44.) After Officer Greer objected to the 
memorandum as irrelevant because it was drafted after the fact, the Commission ruled 
"not [to] admit that document as part of the record." (R. 236:303.) 
After the hearings before the Commission, the Department knew the same 
deficiencies remained. Thus, the Department's counsel again tried to supplement the 
record with the facts contained in its original 40-page supplemental memorandum by 
submitting 34 pages of findings of fact for the Commission to adopt, even though the 
Commission had already made its findings of fact. (R. 252-86.) Officer Greer objected 
that the Commission had already made its findings, and the Commission again did not 
adopt the Department's version of the facts. (R. 289-93.) 
On appeal, the Department continues to assert its version of the facts—twice 
rejected by the Commission—by scattering them throughout its brief. The most 
egregious example is the Department's repeated assertion that the Commission found that 
during the Mikanovic Incident, "Officer Greer began poking or touching Vanja in the 
chest" and "Officer Greer poked or touched Vanja in the chest." (Resp. Br. at 7, 34.) 
This fact is significant because it formed the basis of Chief Dinse's original conclusion 
that Officer Greer had committed "violence in the workplace." (R. 2.) Importantly, the 
Commission did not—and indeed could not—find that Officer Greer ever touched Vanja 
Mikanovic. Instead, the Commission could find only that Officer Greer's conduct was 
"sufficient to give the impression to surrounding witnesses Greer was touching, poking, 
or pushing Vanja Mikanovic." (R. 300 (emphasis added).) The Commission could not 
find more than it did, as Mr. Mikanovic himself—no fan of Officer Greer—testified that 
Officer Greer never touched him. (R. 188:1076-77; 219:15.) Also significantly, when 
the Commission made its formal findings concerning the Mikanovic Incident, it did not 
include violence in the workplace. (R. 303.) The lack of the most serious charge found 
by Chief Dinse in the Commission's formal findings is itself sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the Chiefs decision to terminate Officer Greer. 
Another example of the Department asserting facts contrary to the Commission's 
findings is the Department's repeated assertion that the "SLCPD expected patrol officers 
to handle any dispatch call assigned to them." (Resp. Br. at 16, 40.) To support this 
assertion, the Department does not cite the express rule stating as much because Officer 
Greer (tellingly) was not charged under that rule. Instead, the Department cites four 
pages of Sergeant Bailey's testimony. The Department's factual assertion is again 
significant because, if true, it makes it appear inappropriate for Officer Greer to question 
whether a Westside call was properly assigned to him while he was working on the 
Eastside. However, Sergeant Bailey's testimony does not support the Department's 
factual assertion. Instead, Sergeant Bailey testified that it was only proper to assign calls 
to officers in another area when there was a backlog, which is precisely what the 
Commission found and what Officer Greer represented in his opening brief. 
In the pages cited by the Department, Sergeant Bailey states that dispatch should 
assign Eastside officers Westside calls only if the Westside officers (i) "have a lot of 
calls, they're backlogged and they're running from call to call to call," or (ii) "to cover 
the [Wjestside backlog," or (iii) "if the [WJestside was getting a lot of calls or 
backlogged," or (iv) "if they were being hammered for calls, we were going to go handle 
them." (R. 139:530-31.) Presumably based upon this testimony, the Commission found 
8
 "Officers shall respond to all calls assigned by the dispatcher, and will keep the 
dispatcher advised of all changes of activity or status." SLCPD Policy D30-05-00.00 
(Opening Brief at Addendum A). 
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that "[despatch had been directed by the Westside shift supervisor to send calls to 
Eastside shift officers to relieve a backlog of calls." (R. 297.) In the opening brief, 
Officer Greer states that Sergeant Bailey had ordered Eastside officers, such as Officer 
Greer, to accept Westside calls "as long as there was a backlog," and "it would have been 
inappropriate for a dispatcher to assign a Westside call to an Eastside officer unless there 
was a backlog." (Opening Br. at 11, 12.) The Department prefers its own version of the 
facts because it makes Officer Greer's questioning of the call assignment appear 
unreasonable and uncooperative. Again, it is the Department, not Officer Greer, which 
does not accept the Commission's findings of fact. 
Another example is the Department's assertion that during the Dispatch Incident 
Officer Greer "refused to accept a second call [from dispatch]," a fact the Department 
repeatedly urged the Commission to find. (Resp. Br. at 40.) However, as stated above, 
Officer Greer was not charged with refusing to accept a call from dispatch and the 
Commission did not find he refused to accept a call from dispatch. Instead, the 
Commission found only that the dispatcher "interpreted" Officer Greer's conduct as 
refusing to accept the call. (R. 298.) The Commission had little choice but to make this 
finding, as Officer Greer was the officer who worked the call. (R. 298.) 
To support its desired factual finding, the Department states that "[djuring 2003, 
when a police officer told a dispatcher to put him or her ' 10-8,' or that he or she would be 
'10-8,' the dispatcher and other police officers understood that the police officer was 
unavailable to take a call." (Resp. Br. at 15 (emphasis added).) The Department did not 
take this position before the Commission, and it appears to do so now to imply that 
Officer Greer refused to take the call merely by uttering "10-8." However, 10-8 means 
AAiQ'yn 1 1 
the exact opposite, something undisputed until now. Uttering "10-8" conveys "I'm 
available" (R. 138:77), something the Commission expressly found: "'Okay, I'll be ten-
eight,' which means he would be available for other calls " (R. 298.) Again, it is the 
Department that rejects the factual findings of the Commission. 
The Court should reject the Department's attempt to introduce facts on appeal that 
were twice rejected by the Commission. The Court should also reject the Department's 
attempt to re-characterize Officer Greer's arguments as addressing the sufficiency of 
evidence to support factual findings, when Officer Greer's arguments address whether the 
Commission's factual findings permit the Commission's rulings. See Drake, 939 P.2d at 
181 (quotations and citation omitted) (the legal effect of specific facts "is the province of 
the appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such 
questions of law"). Officer Greer does not challenge factual findings, and therefore, he 
had no obligation to marshal. Even if he did, however, the result would be the Court 
accepting the very factual findings Officer Greer bases his arguments upon. The 
Department's marshaling argument is beside the point. 
III. The Department Does Not Address Officer Greer's Arguments and Does Not 
Argue Harmless Error 
While the Department spends the bulk of its brief addressing the marshaling 
requirement, it fails to address the first four grounds for reversal raised by Officer Greer. 
By failing to address Officer Greer's arguments, the arguments stand unopposed on 
appeal. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a response brief 
shall include the same elements as the opening brief, a requirement interpreted to require 
a response brief to "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellee with respect to 
441R?A 
the issues presented in the [opening] brief." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^ 22, 16 P.3d 
540. The Department fails to do this. 
Not only has the Department failed to address four of the five grounds for reversal 
advanced by Officer Greer, it also failed to argue that the Commission's numerous errors 
were harmless. The Department's failure to argue harmless error is more understandable. 
As Officer Greer demonstrated in the opening brief, his termination is sufficiently 
tenuous that removal of any of the alleged violations would create a "reasonable 
probability of affecting the outcome of the case." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchu 817 P.2d 
789, 797 (Utah 1991). Officer Greer's arguments stand unopposed, and they provide 
sufficient ground for the Court to vacate the decision by the Commission. 
IV. The Court Should Vacate the Commission's Order on Five Separate Grounds 
Because the Department does not directly address Officer Greer's arguments, 
addressing the Department's response brief requires only a brief discussion of them. 
Officer Greer will discuss them in the order they appear in the opening brief. Each 
ground is sufficient for the Court to vacate the Commission's order. 
A. The Court Should Reverse the Commission's Ruling that Officer Greer 
Failed to Support Coworkers Because the Commission Never Found 
Officer Greer Refused to Respond to the Two Dispatch Calls 
The Commission ruled that Officer Greer violated the Department's policy 
requiring officers to support coworkers9 during two exchanges with a dispatcher who was 
attempting to assign calls to Officer Greer. The Court reviews "an agency's application 
of its own rules for reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not 
9
 The Department's policy concerning support of coworkers reads: "Employees shall 
perform their duties in a cooperative and supportive manner, one with another." SLCPD 
Policy D20-05-00.00 (Opening Brief at Addendum A). 
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total deference." Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). The Commission found that during each exchange with the dispatcher, Officer 
Greer's "response to the assignment was reasonably interpreted as a refusal to accept the 
call." (R. 298, 301.) What the Commission did not find was the Officer Greer refused to 
take the calls, and, as explained in the opening brief, this was not an oversight on the part 
of the Commission. (Opening Br. at 32-34.) 
Because the Commission could not find that Officer Greer refused to take either 
call, the Department's charge that Officer Greer refused to support coworkers has no 
reasonable basis. The only reasonable interpretation of the unambiguous policy requiring 
officers to be supportive of coworkers is that to violate the policy, an officer must be 
found to have been unsupportive, not that someone else believed the officer was 
unsupportive. The Court should reverse the Commission's ruling that during the 
Dispatch Incident Officer Greer violated the policy requiring him to support coworkers. 
B. The Court Should Reverse the Commission's Ruling that Officer Greer 
was Disrespectful of Authority for Uttering Vulgar Words to 
Lieutenant Orgill Because the Department Previously Found Officer 
Greer Did Not Utter Those Words 
The Commission ruled that Officer Greer was disrespectful of authority10 when he 
uttered "vulgar and angry references" about the dispatcher to Lieutenant Orgill. (R. 298.) 
The vulgar and angry references were, "You mean that ignorant scum bag slut that can't 
get anything right and has never gotten anything right and I've complained over and over 
10
 "Employees shall display courtesy and respect in words, deeds, gestures, and actions 
towards personnel holding higher levels of authority." SLCPD Policy D20-05-01.00 
(Opening Brief at Addendum A). 
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and no one up the fucking food chain has ever done anything about it?" (R. 121:2; 
138:132, 168.) 
The problem with this finding is that the Department had already found there was 
insufficient evidence to conclude Officer Greer uttered these words to Lieutenant Orgill. 
During initial interviews with Internal Affairs, both Officer Greer and Officer Stuck— 
who was also present at the time—emphatically denied Officer Greer had uttered those 
vulgar words. (R. 121:69, 79, 82.) For their denial, both Officer Greer and Officer Stuck 
were charged with untruthfulness. Ultimately, the Department could not sustain the 
untruthfulness charge against either officer, formally finding there was "not sufficient 
evidence" to conclude Officer Greer in fact said those vulgar words. (R. 138:274; 
138A:441;230.) 
At the hearing before the Commission, Lieutenant Orgill testified that had Officer 
Greer not uttered the vulgar words "ignorant scum bag slut" and "fucking," then his 
response would have been entirely appropriate. (R. 138:177-78.) Thus, the 
Commission's entire ruling that Officer Greer was disrespectful of authority hinges upon 
his uttering those vulgar words. 
However, because the Department had already formally found that there was 
insufficient evidence that Officer Greer uttered those vulgar words, it could not maintain 
a contrary position before the Commission. First, the Commission must consider prior 
Department findings when reviewing Department actions, which here preclude its ruling 
that Officer Greer was disrespectful of authority. See Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 
UT App 274, f 13, 116 P.3d 973 (holding that the Commission was under an obligation to 
consider untruthfulness charge stemming from an investigation because it was relevant to 
the grounds for termination). 
Second, the Department's formal findings concerning the utterance of those words 
estopped the Department from taking a contrary position before the Commission. Under 
Utah's judicial estoppel doctrine, "[a] person may not, to the prejudice of another 
person[,] deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons 
or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was successfully 
maintained." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 
1995) (citation omitted). "The purpose of judicial estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of 
oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as 
knowing misrepresentation or fraud on the courts." Id. There is no reason for this 
estoppel doctrine not to apply to Department adjudications, which involve much more 
serious oaths taken by police officers, who will lose their jobs if they lie under oath and 
who are expressly charged with reflecting the integrity of the entire Department. Lucas 
v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 755-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(requiring the Commission to apply evidence safeguards because "although the 
11
 A Garrity warning allows a police officer's superiors to order an officer to provide 
information during an investigation, and requires the officer to comply, but provides that 
any information elicited by such order cannot be used against the officer in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). During the 
investigation, the officer "shall not lie, or knowingly or willfully depart from the whole 
truth in giving testimony, or in rendering an official report, or in giving any official 
statement about any incident that relates to the employee's employment or position." 
SLCPD Policy D20-10-00.00. 
12
 "Compromise your integrity by lying during police investigations; on official police 
reports or in court testimony and you not only affect your credibility, but also the 
credibility of the entire agency if not the profession." SLCPD Policy A2-09-02.00. 
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Commission is not bound by formal rules of evidence and procedures, it is not above the 
law."). A finding of dishonesty by a police officer has long-lasting effects, as once an 
officer is found to be dishonest, prosecutors must disclose this fact whenever the officer 
will testify in criminal cases, thereby undermining credibility. Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
Acting as both prosecutor and court, the Department found through its own formal 
proceedings that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Officer Greer ever 
uttered the vulgarities. Thus, the Department was estopped from advancing a 
contradictory factual position in the very same case before the Commission. To allow the 
Department to maintain a position contrary to its own formal findings would present the 
very danger the doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to prevent. This case exemplifies the 
danger, as once the Department realized it could not prove Officer Greer and Officer 
Stuck were "untruthful" when they denied Officer Greer uttered the vulgarities, the 
Department repackaged the same charge as failure to show "proper respect for authority" 
for uttering those same vulgarities. The Commission abused its discretion when it ruled 
that Officer Greer had been disrespectful of authority in violation of D20-05-01.00, as the 
Department was precluded from maintaining that position in the first place. The Court 
should reverse. 
C. The Court Should Reverse the Commission's Ruling that Officer Greer 
Was Insubordinate for Having No Legitimate Reason to Delay Leaving 
the Scene of the Mikanovic Incident Because the Commission Found 
Only that Officer Greer Failed to Convey Adequately His Reason to 
Lieutenant Orgill 
The Commission also ruled that Officer Greer violated the Department's 
insubordination policy when "Lieutenant Orgill was required to tell Greer to [leave the 
scene of the Mikanovic Incident] three or four times, with the last time in a stern and 
commanding voice." (R. 303.) Officer Greer claimed that his delay in complying was 
due to the fact that he had not completed his duties as the initial responding officer and 
was attempting to explain to Lieutenant Orgill what work remained before leaving the 
scene. The Commission found Officer Greer nonetheless was insubordinate because "he 
did not adequately convey those concerns to Lieutenant Orgill[, who] understood Greer's 
refusal to leave as limited solely to Greer's anger over his perception of Vanja 
Mikanovic's alleged threats."13 (R. 300.) 
Again, the Court reviews "an agency's application of its own rules for 
reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total deference." 
Lunnen, 886 P.2d at 72. The Department appears to maintain that if an officer questions 
an order and attempts to explain why it may not be best to comply, he is thereby 
insubordinate. (Resp. Br. at 34-36.) Department policy suggests otherwise. The policy 
states that "[w]hen disagreements between management and employees occur, 
management has the right to expect employees to follow the accepted labor principle of 
'obey now and grieve later.'" SLCPD Policy D20-03-00.00 (Opening Brief at 
Addendum A). This policy contemplates that an officer must "obey now and grieve 
later" only after "disagreements" occur, which plainly contemplates that an officer may 
question authority initially, just as Officer Greer did here. 
The Commission did not find that Officer Greer failed to comply with the order, 
but only that he did not do so quickly. The Commission did not find that Officer Greer 
had "completed all of his responsibilities as the initial or responding officer in the case," 
13
 Importantly, from the time of this incident to the present Officer Greer consistently has 
agreed that his comments to Mr. Mikavonic were inappropriate and unprofessional. 
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but instead found that Officer Greer "did not adequately convey those concerns to 
Lieutenant Orgill[, who] understood Greer's refusal to leave as limited solely to Greer's 
anger over his perception of Vanja Mikanovic's alleged threats." (R. 300.) The 
Commission's ruling that Officer Greer was insubordinate is not supported by its own 
factual findings. The Court should reverse. 
- D. The Court Should Reverse the Commission's Conclusion that 
Termination is Proportionate Because the Commission Impermissibly 
Considered Prior Training as Discipline 
In addition to reviewing the violations alleged by the Department, the Commission 
also had to determine whether "the charges warrant the sanction imposed." Lucas v. 
Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This inquiry 
"breaks down into two sub-questions: First, is the sanction proportional; and second, is 
the sanction consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department pursuant to its 
own policies." Kelly v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, T[21, 8 P.3d 
1048. 
In answering the first question, the Commission ruled that the Department 
satisfied its burden to demonstrate Officer Greer's termination is "proportionate to the 
offense." (R. 307.) The Commission's ruling hinged upon its assessment of Officer 
Greer's prior disciplinary record because, according to the Commission, it demonstrated 
that "progressive discipline" had been ineffective. (R. 306.) The Commission first 
recognized that between 1989 and 1998, there was a nine-year gap with "no disciplinary 
action of any kind" against Officer Greer. (R. 306.) The Commission then stated that 
"[i]n March of 1998 through August of 2002, Greer was subject to three disciplinary 
actions." (R. 306.) 
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These three "disciplinary actions" were crucial to the Commission, as it later states 
that "[wjere it not for the incidents from 1998 to 2002, this gap would have shown the 
effectiveness of progressive discipline and . . . [i]f Officer Greer had maintained this 
period of good behavior through to the present, this matter would not have come before 
the Commission." (R. 306.) The problem with the Commission's ruling is that there 
were not three "disciplinary actions" between 1998 and 2002, as two were "instructional 
interviews," which are purposefully not discipline under Department policy. 
Instead, instructional interviews are just what the Department conceded they were 
at the hearing, "a training," which is reflected by the fact that "discipline" and 
"instruction" are located in entirely different sections of the policy manual. 
(R. 235:12.) The two instructional interviews at issue here prove the point. In 1998, 
Sergeant Cracroft placed an "instructional interview" form in Officer Greer's file, which 
simply recites the policy to support coworkers and concerning taking breaks, reminding 
Officer Greer that "[dispatchers may not authorize additional officers to be on break." 
(R. 306; 220:110.) In 2002, another "instructional interview" was placed in Officer 
Greer's file after Officer Greer asked a dispatcher for keys to an evidence locker, for 
which Officer Greer was reminded that "[despatch supervisors and/or other employees of 
the dispatch office or records office are not obligated to retrieve and deliver evidence 
keys from the dispatch office to officer who may need them." (R. 220:123.) 
These instructional interviews (aside from bring trivial) are not discipline, as they 
do not even find a violation of policy. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. 
14
 Discipline is outlined in SLCPD Policy D38-03-00.00, whereas instructional interviews 
are outlined in SLCPD Policy C09-04-02.00(7), which describes them as a "one-on-one 
training." (Opening Br. at Addendum A.) 
Common, 2005 UT App 397, **3-4, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 398 (previous sustained 
violations are relevant); Qgden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, 1[12, 116 P.3d 
973 (must consider "violations of department rules which merited discipline"). Instead, 
instructional interviews are just what the Department conceded they were at the hearing, 
"a training - or an instructional interview.'" (R. 235:12.) 
The Court need not look beyond the Commission's own statement that but for the 
three disciplinary actions between 1998 and 2002, "the matter would not have come 
before the Commission." (R. 306.) Once the two incidents improperly characterized as 
discipline are removed,15 by the Commission's own standard, termination is 
disproportionate. The Court should reverse. 
E. The Court Should Reverse the Commission's Ruling that Termination 
is Consistent with Prior Discipline Because the Commission 
Improperly Considered Resignation Cases 
In addition to determining whether the sanction was proportionate to the offense, 
the Commission also determined whether "the sanction is consistent with previous 
sanctions imposed by the department pursuant to its own policies." Kelly v. Salt Lake 
15
 The only discipline between 1989 and 2002 occurred during the Olympics, and the 
Department considered it so insignificant at the time that the letter imposing the 
suspension did not contain the language the Department routinely includes when it 
considers an incident serious—that future violations will "result in termination of your 
employment." (R. 229:35, 39, 43, 52, 58, 68, 72, 75, 89, 97, 102, 106, 119, 142, 150.) 
Officer Greer's letter does not contain this language, which is consistent with other letters 
in the record describing less serious incidents. (R. 229:60, 108, 122, 126.) 
This omission is significant, as the Court has held that prior discipline with a warning 
that termination could result from future violations is crucial in assessing whether 
termination is proportionate. See Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at f25 (upholding the 
termination of Officer Kelly because she had been "progressively disciplined" and 
warned that "ANY future violations of Department policy will not be tolerated and if 
such violations(s) occur, your employment status will be in jeopardy"). 
Civil Serv. Common, 2000 UT App 235, f21, 8 P.3d 1048 (emphasis added). In making 
this determination, the Commission compared Officer Greer's termination to "fourteen 
circumstances in which a police officer chose to resign prior to or in lieu of disciplinary 
action," which the Commission found "helpful in examining Greer's termination," even 
discussing four of the resignation cases at length. (R. 307-08.) As the Commission 
noted, among the officers who resigned, one resigned before any decision as to discipline 
had been made, and the others were only "on the brink of being terminated." (R. 
236:271.) What the record also reveals, and neither the Commission nor the Department 
contradicts, is that while the Department may have decided that a sanction was 
appropriate, it had not decided which sanction was appropriate, or, more important, had 
not communicated such a decision to the officer before they resigned. (R. 229:243-307.) 
In other words, contrary to the implicit suggestion of the Department, the officers who 
resigned did not know the Department had decided to terminate them, even assuming the 
Department had made such a decision. 
The bottom line is that none of these officers were sanctioned, and therefore there 
was no sanction for Officer Greer's termination to be consistent or inconsistent with. The 
resignation cases are irrelevant. The Department addresses this argument by asserting 
that "requiring the [Commission] to ignore such cases would lead to an absurd result." 
(Resp. Br. at 47.) The Department then explains the absurd result as follows: "Assume 
thirteen individuals engaged in the exact same misconduct. Knowing that the department 
planned to terminate their employment based upon the nature of the misconduct, the 
thirteen employees resigned. The thirteen resignations should not immunize the 
fourteenth employee from termination for that same conduct." (Resp. Br. at 47.) 
The Department's explanation fails to address Officer Greer's argument in a 
number of ways. First, it is worth noting that the Department is careful not to say that the 
resigning officers know the department is planning to terminate them, as the Department 
knows that in the resignation cases at issue here the officers did not know what sanction, 
if any, the Department had decided upon. Second, Officer Greer does not argue that the 
resignation cases somehow benefit him—by "immunizing" him or otherwise—but 
instead maintains that the resignation cases are irrelevant. Third, there is nothing absurd 
about requiring the Department to demonstrate that the sanctions it imposes are consistent 
with sanctions it previously imposed. The Department simply needs to do so without 
reference to resignation cases, just as they would for the first officer to commit the 
offense envisioned in the Department's example above. 
The resignation cases are irrelevant, and the Commission should not have relied 
upon them. Not only was no sanction imposed in the resignation cases, there is no 
indication the sanction would have been termination. Thus, the Department, and later the 
Commission, cannot compare them to this case as if they involve the sanction of 
termination, which is precisely what was done here.16 Officer Greer demonstrated in the 
opening brief that once the resignation cases are properly ignored, termination in this case 
is not consistent with prior sanctions imposed by the Department. (Opening Br. at 45-
50.) In response, the Department does not suggest otherwise. The Court should reverse. 
16
 When convenient for the Department, its counsel appears to agree: "I'm questioning 
whether the Commission ought to be comparing an allegation against a fully matured 
case and drawing some conclusion regarding disparate treatment without doing its own 
independent investigation into the matter to determine whether or not wrong has 
occurred." (R. 235:102.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Many of the violations the Commission sustained against Officer Greer are 
unsupported by the very factual findings made by the Commission. For instance, the 
Commission ruled that Officer Greer had refused to support coworkers because a 
dispatcher believed he had refused to take two calls, not because he had refused to take 
the calls. Similarly, the Commission ruled that Officer Greer was insubordinate because 
he did not adequately convey to a lieutenant his reason for delaying his departure from 
the Mikanovic Incident, not because he had no reason to delay. Neither factual finding 
supports a violation. 
In addition, the charge of disrespect for authority cannot be sustained because the 
very facts that the Commission found to support it were previously and formally found by 
the Department to lack "sufficient evidence." Therefore, the Department was estopped 
from advancing a contrary position before the Commission. 
With (or without) these charges removed, Officer Greer's termination was both 
disproportionate to the offense and inconsistent with prior punishment, each a sufficient 
ground for reversal. As the Commission stated in its ruling, the Commission had to 
consider prior training as prior discipline to conclude that termination was proportionate. 
Once Officer Greer's training is properly characterized as such, by the Commission's 
own standards, termination was not proportionate. 
Termination also was not consistent with prior punishment. The Commission 
appears to have recognized this when it was required to consider resignation cases to 
conclude the Department had been consistent. However, these cases are irrelevant not 
only because no discipline was ever imposed but also because before the officers 
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resigned, they were not aware of what, if any, discipline would be imposed. Once the 
resignation cases are ignored, termination in this case is plainly inconsistent with prior 
discipline. 
The Court should vacate the Commission's order sustaining Officer Greer's 
termination, and reinstate Officer Greer to his position as a police officer, a position he 
served with distinction for more than 24 years. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2007. 
Snell&WilmerL.L.P. 
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